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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction for the Utah Court of Appeals to hear this
appeal is conferred by Utah Code Ann,, §78-2a-3(2)(b) (1991).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A.

Did the trial court err in granting defendants' Rule

12(b)(1) motion

to dismiss with respect to plaintiff F.O.P.

because it based that ruling on erroneous factual findings and
incorrect conclusions of law and because it applied the appellate
standing test?

The trial court's findings of fact that underlie

its ruling are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) (1987); Christensen v. Munns,
812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah Ct.App. 1991); Horton v. Gem State Mut. of
Utah, 794 P.2d

847, 849

(Utah Ct.App. 1990); Mountain States

Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah Ct.App. 1989).
In order to successfully challenge the trial court's findings of
tact, plaintiffs must first marshall the evidence supporting the
findings and then demonstrate that the findings are nonetheless
clearly erroneous.

West Valley City v. Magestic, 818 P.2d 1311,

1315 (Utah Ct.App. 1991); Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 73
(Utah Ct.App. 1991) ; Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale,
783

P.2d

551, 553

(Utah

Ct.App.

1989).

The

trial

court's

conclusions of law with respect to subject matter jurisdiction
are reviewed independently for correctness and no deference is
given to the trial court.

Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 190

-1-

U.A.R.

48, 48 f

P.2d

(Utah Ct.App. 1992); Lopez v.

Career Service Review Boardf

188 U.A.R.

19, 20,

P.2d

(Utah Ct.App. 1992); Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771
1033
bring

(Utah 1989).
this

F.O.P., as an association, had standing to

action

under

Utah

Restaurant Association

County Board of Health, 709 P.2d

1159

arguendo, that

F.O.P.

did

v.

Davis

(Utah 1985); Society of

Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d
Assuming,

P.2d

1166

not meet

(Utah 1987).

the

traditional

standing criteria, F.O.P. should have been granted standing under
the alternative standing tests enunciated in Jenkins v. Swan, 675
P.2d

1145

(Utah 1983); accord, Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d

442

(Utah 1978); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d
451 (Utah 1985) .
this case.

The appellate standing test does not apply in

Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743

P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah 1987).
B.

Did the trial court err

12(b)(1) motion

in granting defendants' Rule

to dismiss with

respect

to plaintiff

Crowley

because it based that ruling on erroneous factual findings and
incorrect conclusions of law?
that

underlie

its

erroneous" standard.

ruling

The trial court's findings of fact
are

reviewed

under

the

"clearly

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) (1987);

Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah Ct.App. 1991); Horton
v. Gem State Mut. of Utah, 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct.App. 1990);
Mountain States Broadcasting v. Neale, 783 P.2d
-2-

551, 553

(Utah

Ct.App. 1989) .
factual

An appellant may demonstrate the clear error of

findings

only

supports the finding.

after

marshalling

the

evidence

that

West Valley City v. Majesticy 818 P.2d

1311, 1315 (Utah Ct.App. 1991); Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d
69, 73 (Utah Ct.App. 1991); Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v.
Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah Ct.App. 1989).

The trial court's

conclusions of law are accorded no deference and are reviewed for
correctness.
P.2d

Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 190 U.A.R. 48, 48,
(Utah Ct.App. 1992); Lopez v. Career Service

Board, 188 U.A.R. 19, 20,
Berube v. Fashion

P.2d

(Utah Ct.App. 1992);

Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d

1033

(Utah 1989).

Crowley has standing in this action because he satisfied the
traditional standing test by demonstrating, through the Corrected
Amended Complaint and affidavits of record that he suffered a
distinct and palpable injury caused by defendants that gave him a
personal stake in the outcome of this action.

Jenkins v. Swan,

675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983).
C.
not

have

Did the trial court err when it determined that it did
subject

matter

jurisdiction

over

this

action

and

therefore denied plaintiffs1 and proposed co-plaintiffs1 motion
for joinder because it was moot?

Joinder of co-plaintiffs in an

action is permissive under Utah Rule of Procedure 20 and within
the trial court's discretion.

Denial of the motion for joinder,

as with other discretionary matters is reviewed under an abuse of
-3-

discretion standard.

Seftel v. Capital City Banky 767 P. 2d 941

(Utah Ct.App. 1989)(indispensible parties under Rule 19); Tolman
v. Salt Lake County, 818 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct.App. 1991).

Joinder

was not a moot issue in this case because plaintiffs had standing
and the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
STATUTES;
Utah Code Ann., §10-3-1002 (1977):
The classified civil service shall consist of all
places of employment now existing or hereafter created
in or under the police department and the fire
department of each city of the first and second class,
and the health department in cities of the first class,
except the head of the departments, deputy chiefs of
the police and fire departments and assistant chiefs of
the police department in cities of the first and second
class, and the members of the board of health of the
departments. No appointments to any of the places of
employment constituting the classified civil service in
the departments shall be made except according to law
and under the rules and regulations of the Civil
Service Commission.
The head of each of the
departments may, and the deputy chiefs of the police
and fire departments and assistant chiefs of the police
department shall, be appointed from the classified
civil service, and upon the expiration of his term or
upon the appointment of a successor shall be returned
thereto.
Utah Code Ann., §10-3-1003 (1977):
In each city of the first and second class there
shall be a civil service commission, consisting of
three members appointed by the board of commissioners.
Their term of office shall be six years, but they shall
be appointed so that the term of office of one member
shall expire on the 30th day of June of each
even-numbered year. If a vacancy occurs in the civil
service commission, it shall be filled by appointment
by the board of city commissioners for the unexpired
term.
-4-

Utah Code Ann., §10-3-1007 (1977):
All applicants for employment in the classified civil
service shall be subject to examination, which shall be
public, competitive and free. Examinations shall be
held at such times and places as the civil service
commission shall from time to time determine, and shall
be for the purpose of determining the qualifications of
applicants
for positions.
Examinations
shall be
practical and shall fairly test the fitness in every
respect of the persons examined to discharge the duties
of the positions to which they seek to be appointed,
and shall include tests of physical qualifications and
health.
Utah Code Ann., §10-3-1010 (1983):
The civil service commission shall provide for
promotion in the classified civil service on the basis
of ascertained merit, seniority in service and standing
obtained by competitive examination, and shall provide,
in all cases where practicable, that vacancies shall be
filled by promotion from the members of the next lower
rank as submit themselves for the examination and
promotion. The civil service commission shall certify
to the appointing power the names of not more than five
applicants
having
the
highest
rating
for
each
promotion.
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code
Code
Code
Code

Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.

§52-4-1
§52-4-3
§52-4-4
§52-4-5

(1977)
(1977)
(1977)
(1977)

(Please
(Please
(Please
(Please

see
see
see
see

Addendum
Addendum
Addendum
Addendum

for
for
for
for

text)
text)
text)
text)

PROCEDURAL RULES:
Rule 20, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1987):
Addendum for text)
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1988):
Addendum for text)

(Please see
(Please see

RULES:
Rule 1-6, W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M.

(1988):

Any proposed amendments, additions or deletions to
the West Valley City Civil Service Commission Rules and
-5-

Regulations shall be recommended to the Council by the
City Manager after being submitted for consideration
and adoption by majority vote of the Commission. The
Council must disapprove the proposed amendment within
60 days from the date of submission of the proposed
amendment, or it is automatically approved.
Rule 11-12, W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M.

(1988):

All examiners selected by the Commission shall
conduct examination under the supervision of the
Personnel Officer and in accordance with such methods
as the Commission shall prescribe. All examinations
shall be impartial, fair and practical, and designed to
test the relative qualifications
and
fitness of
applicants to discharge duties of the particular
position which they seek to fill. No question in any
examination shall relate to the political, racial or
religious convictions or affiliations of the applicant.
Rule III-l, W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. (1988):
The Commission shall provide for promotion in the
Civil Service on the basis of ascertained merit,
seniority
in
service
and
standing
obtained
by
competitive examination, and shall provide, in all
cases where practicable, that vacancies shall be filled
by promotion from the members of the next lower rank as
submit themselves for the examination and promotion.
The Commission shall certify to the Chief from an
eligibles list the names of not more than 5 applicants
having the highest rating for each promotion.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This appeal is taken from the final orders entered by the
Honorable

Leslie

A.

Lewis

dismissing

the

action

for

lack

of

standing pursuant to the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants
and denying the Motion for Joinder for reasons of mootness.

-6-

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.

Plaintiffs/appellants, West Valley City Fraternal Order of
Police Lodge No. 4 ("F.O.P.") and Jim Crowley
nally

brought

this

action

against

defendants/appellees,

Valley Civil Service Merit Commission
Dennis Nordfelt

("Crowley") origiWest

("Commission") and Chief

("Nordfelt"), to set aside the results of the

promotion examination process, including the written examination
administered on July 20, 1989, utilized by the West Valley City
Police Department

("Department") to determine which

candidates

from the Department would be eligible for promotion to the rank
of sergeant.
and

During the course of the proceedings, plaintiffs

additional

William

F.O.P.

Salmon

("Salmon"),

action as co-plaintiffs
plaintiffs
Findings
431-437],

members,

challenge

filed

the

entered

a

Shopay

("Shopay")

joint motion

to

[R. 216, 217, 330, 333].
Court's

of Fact, Conclusions
both

David

on

Ruling

March

26,

1992.

the

Specifically,

[R. 428-430]

of Law, Decision

join

and

and

the

and Order

[R.

A

handful

of

pleadings, including the trial court's original ruling, preceeded
the March 26, 1992 orders challenged by this appeal; they are, in
chronological order:
(a)

Court's

[Initial] Ruling

- signed

11/15/91

[R.

411-413];
(b)

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and

Order - submitted by defendants on or about 11/23/91

-7-

(does not

appear in Record);
Plaintiffs 1

(c)

Objections

to

Defendants 1

Proposed

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order - filed
by plaintiffs 12/6/91

Defendants 1

(d)
Defendants'

[R. 422-427];

Proposed

to Plaintiffs 1

Response

Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions

Decision and Order - filed by defendants 12/18/92
(e)
Law, Decision
12/18/91

(Second
and

Draft)

Order

-

Findings

submitted

of

by

Objection

Fact,

of

to

Law,

[R. 414-419];
Conclusions

defendants

on

or

of

about

(does not appear in Record); and
(f)

Notice

to Submit

for Decision

-

filed by

plain-

tiffs 2/19/92 [R. 420-421].

C.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT:

In the Court's Ruling (R. 428-430] and the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order

[R. 431-437] the trial

court granted defendants Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss based on
the conclusion that plaintiffs F.O.P. lacked standing to bring
the action and therefore the court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction over the action and denied the motion for joinder of
additional co-plaintiffs

reasoning

that, absent

subject matter

jurisdiction, the motion was moot.
D.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

F.O.P. is and was an association whose membership consisted
of police officers and staff employed by the West Valley City
-8-

Police Department ("Department") [R. 113, 186, 337]. Crowley and
proposed co-plaintiffs, Salmon and Shopay, are and were employed
by the Department and were F.O.P. members
337] .

(R. 113, 331, 334,

A major purpose of F.O.P, is to ensure fair and equal

treatment of all lodge members in their employment, including
promotions [R. 338].
The Commission is the body appointed pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. , §10-3-1003 (1977) , and charged with
the responsibilities of supplying classified civil service lists
to the Department and of administering the merit civil service
rules and regulations, as they apply to the Department and its
employees, according to Part 10, Chapter 3, Utah Municipal Code
(§§10-3-1001, et seq.) [R. 114, 192, 337]. Nordfelt is, and at
the time of the events in question was, Chief of the Department
[R. 113, 175].
On or about June 6, 1989, Nordfelt, by written memorandum
[R. 6-7, 105-106] announced that a promotion examination was to
be held to establish a roster from which an immediate opening and
future promotions to the position of sergeant would be made [R.
6-7, 105-106, 114].
Approximately one month later, the West Valley City Personnel Office issued a memorandum that, like the June 6, 1989,
memorandum,

stated

only

those

candidates

receiving

the

top

fifteen scores on the written exam would advance to participate
-9-

in the "assessment center" portion of the promotion examination
[R.

6-7,

8-9,

107-108,

114].

That

memorandum

also,

by

implication, indicated that "promotability" was also a part of
the promotion examination process and stated that the "assessment
center" and "promotability" would each be weighted 40% of the
promotion

examination

and

the

written

examination

would

be

weighted 20% of the promotion examination [R. 9, 108].
Several

F.O.P.

members,

including

Crowley,

Shopay

and

Salmon, participated in the promotion examination process and sat
for the July 20, 1989 written exam [R. 331, 334, 338]. Of the
approximately 4 0 officers who sat for the written examination,
all were F.O.P. members [R. 337].
Although the trial court dismissed this action for lack of
standing and did not address the merits of plaintiffs' allegations [R. 429, 436-457], the interjection of a brief summary of
plaintiffs1 claims may provide a useful backdrop before which
additional jurisdictional facts may be presented:

Plaintiffs'

Corrected Amended Complaint alleged two principal improprieties
occurred

in

the

design

and

administration

of

the

promotion

examination and that those improprieties violated provisions of
Utah Code Ann., §§10-3-1001 through 1013 (1977, as amended), the
Utah Open and Public Meetings Act and provisions of the West
Valley

City

Civil

Service

Policy

and

Procedures

("W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M.") [R. 113-118, 331-332, 334-335, 338].
-10-

Manual

First, plaintiffs

alleged

that

defendants

failed

to

include

seniority in service as one of the criteria to be considered in
the promotion process, thus violating Utah Code Ann., §10-3-1010
(1983)

and

its

similarly

worded

counterpart,

Rule

III-l,

W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M.

(1988) [R. 6-9, 113-118, 332, 335, 339].

This

allegation

was

initially

the

Commission

by

letter

brought

dated

August

to

the

23,

attention

1989, by

of

Department

officers who were also F.O.P. members [R. 10-12, 116, 332, 335,
339].

They requested the Commission to review the promotion

evaluation process and declare it invalid

[R. 11, 116].

The

Commission's rules and regulations did not provide method or
means by which Department officers could object to or seek review
of improprieties in the promotion examination process [R. 117,
332, 335, 339]. Without conducting a formal hearing or convening
a meeting to consider the allegations contained in the officers'
August 23, 1989 letter, two Civil Service Commissioners, Guy
Kimball and Don Meyers, signed a letter dated October 4, 1989,
summarily dismissing the issues raised by the officers [R. 113,
116].

A copy of that October 4, 1989 letter was delivered to an

F.O.P. representative on November 2, 1989 [R. 116]. Plaintiffs
allege the two Civil Service Commissioners' actions violated Utah
Code Ann., §§52-4-1 et seq. (1977, as amended) [R. 116-118, 332,
335, 358] . Second, plaintiffs alleged that defendants illegally

-11-

waived the requirement that promotions be made from the next
lower rank, thus violating, for a second time, both Utah Code
Ann,, §10-3-1010 (1983) and Rule III-l, W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. (1988),
requiring, as applied to the Department, promotions to sergeant
to be made from the next lower rank, Police Officer II ("P.O.
II") [R.

110, 117-118, 293-295, 331-332, 334-335, 338]. The

waiver of the next lower rank requirement was initiated by Chief
Nordfelt on June 6, 1989, the same date the promotion examination
was

announced

by Nordfelt,

by memorandum

addressed

to the

Commission requesting that". . . the restriction in the Civil
Service

requirements

stating

that

officers

applying

position of Sergeant be of P.O. II rank, be waived."
117, 293-295].

for the
[R. 110,

Within the rank and grade system utilized by the

Department, the Police Officer I ("P.O. I") rank is lower than
the P.O. II rank, and P.O. I officers are thus not eligible for
promotion to sergeant [R. 292, 337]. Nordfelt's October 6, 1989
letter

was hand-delivered

to Guy Kimball, Chairman

of the

Commission [R. 117, 294]. On or about that same day, Guy Kimball
signed

the letter

294-295].

and marked

it "approved"

[R. 110,

117,

The next lower rank requirement was thereby waived by

a single Commissioner and without the Commission having held a
formal hearing or convened a meeting to deliberate the issue [R.
117-118, 294-295, 338]. Thus, officers of P.O. I rank were
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improperly allowed to participate in the promotion exam process
to the detriment of the candidates of P.O. II rank [R. 117-118,
331, 334, 338]. Plaintiffs allege Chairman Guy Kimball's action
violated

§52-4-1

et. seq.

(1977, as

amended)

and

Rule

1-6,

W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M, (1988) [R. 116-118, 332, 335, 338]. In addition
to the two principal improprieties giving rise to this action,
plaintiffs made two related claims.

They alleged that on or

about October 4, 1989, when the two Commissioners, by letter [R.
13], summarily dismissed the officers' complaints, the Commission
consisted of only two members, and thus was not legally constituted as required by Utah Code Ann., §10-3-1003

(1977) [R.

117] , and they alleged the promotion examination process also
violated

Utah

Code

Ann.

§10-3-1007

(1977)

and

Rule

11-12

W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. (1988) because some candidates were not allowed
equal access to the study materials [R. 10-13, 117].
Approximately September 2, 1989, a roster was established
pursuant to the procedures and weighting set forth in the July 7,
1989 memorandum, and appointments to the position of sergeant
were made [R. 8-9, 114, 186].
Crowley had been a Department officer since July, 1980, and
had held the P.O. II rank since approximately 1981 [R. 113, 337].
At the time of the 198 9 promotion examination he enjoyed nine
years' seniority [R. 338]. His seniority was not considered in
the promotion examination process [R. 6-9, 338]. Crowley sat for
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the written exam portion of the evaluation process but failed, by
one point, to achieve one of the top fifteen scores [R. 7, 8-9,
185, 338]. For that reason he was not allowed to participate in
the other portion of the process [R. 7, 8-9, 107-108, 114, 185,
338].

Crowley believes he would have been allowed to participate

in the other portions of the evaluation process if his seniority
had been considered [R. 115-116, 338]. Had Crowley been informed
of Nordfelt's request to waive the next lower rank requirement,
he would have objected, individually, and on behalf of F.O.P. to
the waiver request [R. 110, 116, 338]. Crowley signed the August
23, 1989 letter to the Commission in which several Department
officers and F.O.P. members objected to the improprieties that
marred

the promotion

examination

[R. 116, 339] .

Crowley

is

entitled to the protections and benefits conferred by the rules
and regulations that comprise West Valley City's merit service
system and state law [R. 114, 337].
Shopay had been a Department officer since November, 1980
[R. 331]. At the time of the 1989 promotion examination he held
the P.O. II rank, had eight years' seniority in the Department
and met all other announced requirements

[R. 6-7, 331].

His

seniority was not considered in the promotion examination process
[R. 6-9, 113-118, 331].

Shopay completed the entire promotion

examination process and earned a position on the promotion roster
IR.

331].

Shopay

had

more

Department
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seniority

than

any

candidate assigned a higher position on the promotion roster [R.
331] .

By

affidavit,

Shopay

alleged

that

even

without

consideration of his seniority he would have earned a higher
position on the roster, the fourth position, if he had not been
torced to compete with the P.O. I officers who were improperly
allowed to participate in the promotion examination [R. 331-332].
Salmon had been a Department officer since December, 1982
and

was

a

examination
requirements

P.O.

II

[R.334].

when

he

participated

in

the

promotion

He met all of the announced eligibility

[R. 6-7, 334].

He had six and one-half years1

seniority with the Department, but it was not considered in the
promotion process [R. 6-9, 113-118, 334]. Salmon completed the
entire promotion examination process and earned a position on the
roster [R. 334] .

Three of the officers who preceded him on the

roster held only the P.O. I rank [R. 334]. By affidavit, Salmon
alleged that even without consideration of his seniority he would
have earned a more favorable position, ninth, on the roster if he
had not been forced to compete with P.O. I officers [R. 334-335].
As Department officers, both Shopay and Salmon were entitled
to the protections and benefits of the W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. rules and
regulations and state law in conjunction with the design and
administration of the promotion examination
334] .

-15-

[R. 114, 192, 331,

As of the date of this appeal, neither Shopayf Salmon or
Crowley has been promoted to the rank of sergeant [R. 186].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The

dismissal, with

respect

because of the association's

to

lack of

F.O.P.,

of

action

standing was based

erroneous facts and incorrect legal conclusions.
support for the challeged

this

on

Although some

findings may be found if the only

factual examination made is of defendants' affidavits, a thorough
review of the record proves the court's findings were clearly
erroneous.

That

having

been

done,

the

facts

contained

in

plaintiffs' pleadings and affidavits and elsewhere in the record
provide a proper factual basis for the determination that F.O.P.
had standing under the association standing test.

The trial

court also erroneously required F.O.P. to satisfy the "appellate
standing" test.
action.

That test simply did not apply to F.O.P. in this

However, assuming that it was applicable, once the trial

court's erroneous findings of fact are ferretted out, F.O.P. can
meet the test.

The trial court's factual findings, the incorrect

determination of F.O.P.'s standing and the resulting dismissal
with respect to F.O.P. should be overturned.
Plaintiffs' claims with respect to Crowley are similar and
factually related to the F.O.P. arguments.

Some of the trial

court's findings bearing on Crowley are clearly erroneous.
the record

is properly viewed

and Crowley's
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When

allegations and

plaintiffs' affidavits are considered, ample factual support for
Crowley's

standing

under

the

traditional

standing

test

is

apparent.

The court's rulings, factual and legal, with respect

to Crowley and his dismissal from the action should be reversed.
The trial court's erroneous determinations that F.O.P. and
Crowley lacked standing fostered an additional error.

The trial

court ruled that because plaintiffs lacked standing the court had
no subject matter jurisdiction and the motion for joinder to add
proposed

co-plaintiffs

Shopay and Salmon was therefore moot.

Clearly, plaintiffs did have standing, and the motion was not
moot.

The trial court's determination of mootness should be

reversed and the motion for joinder should be granted.

ARGUMENTS

I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's dismissal of this action
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on defendants' Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss which asserted
neither F.O.P. nor Crowley was possessed of sufficient standing
to bring this action.
A motion to dismiss is appropriate only where it
clearly appears that the plaintiff or plaintiffs would
not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or
under any state of facts they could prove to support
their claim. ... In determining whether the trial
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court properly granted the motion, we must accept the
factual allegations in the complaint as true and
consider all reasonable inferences to be drawn from
those facts in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff. ...
Prows v. Department of Financial Insts., 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah
1991) (12(b) (6)

motion,

citations

Newspapers, 188 U.A.R. 31, 32,

omitted);
P.2d

West

v.

(Utah Ct.App. 1992);

see also, Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d
(Utah

Ct.App.

1991) .

"The

courts

Thompson

are

a

forum

1356, 1360

for

settling

controversies, and if there is any doubt about whether a claim
should be dismissed for the lack of a factual basis, the issue
should be resolved in favor of giving the party an opportunity to
present its proof."

Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P. 2d

622, 624 (Utah 1990) .
The Utah

Supreme

standing doctrine

Court commented

in Utah

on

the

function

of

the

in Terracor v. Utah Board of State

Lands, 716 P.2d 796, 798-99 (Utah 1986):
The doctrine of standing is intended to assure the
procedural integrity of judicial adjudications by
requiring that the parties to a lawsuit have sufficient
interest in the subject matter of the dispute and
sufficient adverseness that the legal and factual
issues which must be resolved will be thoroughly
explored. Unlike federal law where standing doctrine
is related to the "case or controversy" language of
Article III of the United States Constitution, our
standing law arises from the general precepts of the
doctrine of separation of powers found in Article V of
the Utah Constitution. Under Utah law, the doctrine of
standing operates as a gatekeeper to the courthouse,
allowing in only those cases that are fit for judicial
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resolution. . . . Thus, the doctrine of standing limits
judicial power so that there will not "be a significant
inroad on the representative form of government,
cast[ing] the courts in the role of supervising the
coordinate branches of government
. . . [and
converting] the judiciary into an open forum for the
resolution of political and ideological disputes about
the performance of government." . . . For this reason,
this Court will not lightly dispense with the
requirement that a litigant have a personal stake in
the outcome of a specific dispute. . . . Nevertheless,
it is difficult
to make useful, all-inclusive
generalizations that determine whether standing exists
in any given case, since the issue often depends on the
facts of each case. (citations omitted)
Once the facts have been fully presented by the plaintiff, a
three-step

examination

is

plaintiff's standing to sue.

used

to

determine

an

individual

The first step is concerned with

the traditional standing criteria of the plaintiff's personal
stake in the controversy.

The plaintiff must have suffered "some

distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in
the outcome of the legal dispute."
1145,

1148

(Utah

1983);

accord,

Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P. 2d
Society

of

Professional

Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah 1987); Terracor
v. Utah Board of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1986).
One who is adversely affected by governmental actions
has standing under [the traditional criterion of the
plaintiff's personal stake in the controversy]. One
who is not adversely affected has no standing. . . .
There must also be some causal relationship alleged
between the injury to the plaintiff, the governmental
actions and the relief requested . . .. If the
plaintiff satisfies this requirement, he will be
granted standing and no further inquiry is required,
(citation omitted, emphasis added)
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d, at 1150.
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If a plaintiff cannot satisfy the first step, standing may
nonetheless be granted if no one else has a greater interest in
the outcome of the dispute and the issue is not likely to be
raised at all unless the plaintiff is granted standing.

Jenkins

v. Swany 675 P.2d at 1150; Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake
County, 702 P.2d 451, 454 (Utah 1985).
The third possibility

for granting standing is available

when, in unique cases, the issues are of such great public
importance that they ought to be decided in furtherance of the
public interest.

Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1150.

Jenkins v.

State, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1978).
Under Utah law, an association such as F.O.P. may be granted
standing

to

represent

its members

when

"(i)

the

individual

members of the association have standing to sue; and (ii) the
nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make the
individual participation of each injured party indispensable to
proper resolution of the cause. ..."

Utah Restaurant Association

v. Davis County Board of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Utah 1985)
(quoting Worth v. Sedlin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2211,
45

L.Ed.2d

343

(1975));

See

also,

Journalists, 743 P.2d at 1175.
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Society

of

Professional

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING
F.O.P. DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO
BRING THIS ACTION.

A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Plaintiffs' attack on the trial court's conclusion that
F.O.P. lacked standing is, in initial part and of necessity,
directed at the erroneous and incomplete findings of fact that
underlie and give pseudosupport to the dismissal of
claims.

F.O.P.fs

The factual analysis of the standing issue should extend

beyond the nominal facts necessary under notice pleading to any
additional relevant facts offered by the plaintiff.
.[I]t is within the Court's power to allow or
require the plaintiff to supply, by amendment to the
complaint or by affidavits, further particularized
allegations of fact deemed supportive of plaintiff's
standing.
Worth v. Sedlin, 422 U.S. 490, 491, 45 L.Ed.2d, 343, 95 S.Ct.
2197 (1975) . The findings relative to the initial examination of
F.O.P.'s standing that plaintiffs contend are not supported by
substantial evidence and are unequivocally contradicted by the
facts presented by plaintiffs are, using the numbers assigned by
the trial court:
2. One year of service with the West Valley City
Police Department was required in order to be eligible
for promotion to Sergeant [R. 432].
3. The requirements for promotion to Sergeant required
that applicants hold the rank of Police Officer within
the West Valley City Police Department [R. 432].
4. Within the rank of Police Officer, all grades
(P.O.I, P.O.II and P.O.Ill) were eligible for promotion
to Sergeant with no preference being given to the
members of any one grade [R. 432].
-21-

10.
Members of the FOP did not suffer distinct,
particularized and palpable injury related to the
conduct of Defendants [R. 433].
11. Plaintiff FOP did not present its claims to the
Civil Service Commission prior to the commencement of
this lawsuit [R. 433].
The

trial

affidavits

court

apparently

relied

upon

the

filed by defendants [R. 175-190] in conjunction with

their Motion to Dismiss on February 20, 1991.
apparent

solely

that

the

trial

court

completely

It is equally
disregarded

the

affidavits supplied by plaintiffs [R. 229-232, 330-369], despite
their

being

specifically

into plaintiffs1

incorporated

Reply

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs1 Motion for Joinder [R. at
341] and Plaintiffs1

Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [R. at 345].
Finding of fact number 2 is supported, by inference, only by
the requirement that candidates "must be off probation" [R. 6].
There

is

no

probationary

evidence
period

was

in

the

one

record

year.

indicating

Moreover,

it

that

the

does

not

establish that seniority was properly considered in the process.

All six of defendants' affidavits fail to meet the
requirements of U.R.C.P., 56(e), which states, in pertinent part:
"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissable in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. . . ."
(emphasis added)
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The June 6, 1989 Memorandum issued by Nordfelt stated candidates
must have four years of police service [R. 6]. The October 4,
1989 letter signed by Commissioners Guy Kimball and Don Meyers
confirmed that fact

[R. 13] .

There is no evidence directly

indicating one year of service with the Department was required,
and Finding number 2 is therefore clearly erroneous.

Crowley,

Salmon and Shopay, all of whom are F.O.P. members, have alleged
their seniority was not considered [R. 114-118, 331, 334, 338],
and a requirement that all candidates have one year of service
with the Department is not adequate consideration of seniority.
Furthermore, if officers with only one year of service were
allowed to participate in the promotion exam, that fact would
support plaintiffs' claims that F.O.P. members and Crowley were
made to compete against ineligible candidates.
Finding of fact number 3 is similarly misleading and lacking
in support.

It was only after the next lower rank requirement

was waived by Nordfelt and Guy Kimball that P.O. I officers were
allowed to participate [R. 110, 117, 293-295].

Both state and

local law, however, provided that only officers of the next lower
rank, P.O.

II, be allowed

to compete

for the promotion

117-118, 293-295] [R. 110, 117-118, 293-295; and see,

[R.

Utah Code

Ann., §10-3-1010 (1983) and Rule III-l, W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. (1988)].
Finding number 3 only reflects the state of events after the
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illegal waiver was obtained.

Candidates were required by law to

hold the P.O. II rank.
The trial court's fourth finding is also erroneous for the
reason that, even if read with the other findings, it omits
mention of the change in eligibility that occurred and the time
it occurred.

Like finding number 3, it is supported only by

examination of the time after the next lower rank requirement was
improperly waived [R. 110, 117, 293-295].

Finding number 4 is

contradicted

findings

by,

and

the

trial

court's

omit,

the

overwhelming evidence that only P.O. II officers were eligible
for promotion to sergeant [R. 110, 117, 293-195].

This error in

the court's findings foreclosed the possibility of concluding
that plaintiffs were

injured when P.O.

II officers competed

against a field enlarged because P.O. I officers were allowed to
participate.

Finding number 4, however, to the extent it implies

no preference was given based

on

seniority, is correct, as

discussed above in regard to finding number 2.
Finding

number

10

states

conclusions

that

can

only

be

reached by turning a blind eye to plaintiffs' pleadings and
affidavits, and it is supported by defendants' denials, not by
substantial evidence.

Collecting the evidence that supports the

conclusions is largely a search for negative proof.

There is

some evidence that some F.O.P. members benefitted as a result of
the

inform

design

and

administration
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of

the

promotion

examination

process.

Larry

Moody

and

administered the promotion examination

Stephen

Shreve

[R. 178, 189].

only

Charles

Ilisley was promoted to sergeant on September 2, 1989, Guy Dodge
was also promoted to sergeant, and Craig Gibson was scheduled to
be promoted to sergeant on July 1, 1991 [R. 114, 181, 183, 186].
Finding number 10 nevertheless ignores and is contradicted by the
allegations contained in plaintiffs' pleadings and affidavits.
All of the candidates, including Crowley, Shopay and Salmon, who
participated in the process were F.O.P. members
337-338] .
seniority

[R. 331, 334,

Plaintiffs alleged that defendants failed to include
as a criterion

to be considered

in the promotion

process, thus violating Utah Code Ann., §10-3-1010

(1983) and

Rule III-l, W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. (1988) [R. 6-9, 113-118].
Salmon

and

Shopay

were

not

given

consideration

Crowley,
for

their

seniority and alleged the results they received on the promotion
examination were negatively affected as a result

[R. 331-332,

334-335, 337-338].

Plaintiffs also alleged that P.O. I officers

were

allowed

impermissably

331-332, 334-335, 338].
F.O.P.

members

ineligible

Crowley,

candidates

to participate

[R.

110, 117-118,

Thus, all P.O. II officers, including
Salmon

and

Shopay

competed

against

[R. 118, 186, 331-332, 334-335, 338].

Crowley alleged that he would have objected to the Department's
request to waive the P.O. II requirement, had it not been made
privately

and

without

his
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knowledge

[R.

338] .

Shopay and Salmon alleged they would have earned higher positions
on the promotion roster if they had not been forced to compete
with P.O.

I officers

[R. 331-332, 334].

Plaintiffs

further

alleged that they were not afforded the protection of state law
and

Commission

rules

and

331-332, 334-335, 338].
were

injured

by

the

regulations

due

them

[R. 117-118,

Furthermore, plaintiffs alleged they
actions

of

an

illegally

constituted

Commission when the two members summarily dismissed the officers1
claims [R. 13, 117] and by Nordfelt when some candidates taking
the written exam were not allowed equal access to the study
materials [R. 10-13, 117]. Insofar as the conclusions stated in
finding number 10 may be considered to be findings of fact, they
are clearly erroneous.
Finding number 11 is supported by the affidavit of Cory
Ervin supplied by defendants [R. 184-186].

Cory Ervin stated:

5. As custodian of the records and Secretary to the
Commission, I have no record, nor do I have any
knowledge, of Commission receiving any request, appeal,
or other communication from the organization known as
"West Valley City Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #4"
regarding the 1989 sergeant's examination, except in
connection with the above-encaptioned lawsuit.
6. . . . I have no record, nor do I have any knowledge
of the Commission sending any information, ruling, or
other communication regarding the 1989 sergeants'
examination, except information supplied in connection
with the above-encaptioned lawsuit.
[R. 186] .

Finding number 11 is erroneous because it ignores

plaintiffs'

allegation

that

the

Commission
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was

notified, by

letter dated August 23, 1989, of a variety of objections voiced
by Department officers who were also F.O.P. members [R. 10-12,
110, 116, 332, 335, 339].

It also ignores the allegation that

the Commission's rules and regulations did not provide a process
by which Department officers could object to or seek review of
improprieties in the promotion examination process [R. 117, 332,
335, 339].

The October 4, 1989 letter signed by Commissioners

Guy Kimball and Don Meyers [R. 13, 116] also contradicts finding
number 10, as does Crowley's statement that he would have, if he
had been aware of the waiver that was obtained, objected, on
behalf of F.O.P. and
participation

individually, to the P.O.

[R. 338] .

Clearly

plaintiffs made

I officers'
substantial

efforts to present the claims known to them at that time to the
Commission.

The trial court's finding belies those facts and is

not supported by substantial evidence.
B.

F.O.P. HAS STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION IN ITS
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY.

F.O.P. clearly meets both criteria of the test enunciated in
Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County Board of Health, 709
P.2d 1159, 1163 (Utah 1985).

See also, Society of Professional

Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d

1166, 1170

(Utah 1987).

In

regard to the first criterion, the individual members' standing,
all F.O.P. members are police officers or staff employed by the
Department, subject to Nordfelt's and the Commission's actions,
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and must comply with the demands of and enjoy the benefits of the
merit civil service system.
when, as is alleged

Thus, each F.O.P. member is injured

in this action, the merit system which

governs the employment of each member is violated.

The specific

injuries alleged by F.O.P. have been recognized by the Utah
Supreme Court in Hayward v. Pennock, 444 P.2d 59, 61, 21 Utah 2d
242 (1968):
The reasons for the adoption of a merit system are to
protect employees and the public from the evils of the
spoils system and to assure to each officer an orderly
opportunity for promotion. The good officer thus has
an incentive to remain in the service. When promotions
cease to be made according to the rules adopted, then
there is a tendancy to engender a demoralizing
influence in the ranks of men who, having cut
themselves off from all other occupations, must find
their comfort in the hopes they have of anticipated
promotions made according to the rules of the
commission.
It is axiomatic that each F.O.P. member is sufficiently "injured"
for standing purposes, when he or she has lost the protection of
the merit system that should govern his or her chosen employment,
is demoralized
protection

of

Commission's

by that
state

actions

loss and can no longer rely on the

law in order
that

affect

to be
his

informed
or

her

about the
employment.

Considering the facts alleged by plaintiffs, the trial court's
ruling suggests that F.O.P. members, who are merit employees, do
not have an interest in and cannot be injured by acts of the
Nordfelt and the Commission that directly and adversely affect
their present and future employment and their possibility of
promotion.
-28-

All of the participants in the promotion examination process
were F.O.P. members.

Although not all F.O.P. members actively

vied for a position on the promotion roster , it is not strictly
necessary that all individual F.O.P. members be possessed of
standing.

Utah Restaurant Association, 709 P.2d at 1160, 1163

("some of"

or

"a

substantial

number"

of

the

association's

individual members were subject to the permit fee complained of).
Thusf all F.O.P. members may be said to have suffered an injury,
individually, and the members who actually participated in the
evaluation process have a greater and more direct injury because
their seniority was not considered, they were forced to compete
against improperly authorized P.O. I candidates, the Commission
was not legally constituted when the two Commissioners summarily
dismissed their complaints and some candidates were not allowed
equal access to the study materials.

The F.O.P. members who took

the written exam and, being among the final fifteen candidates,
participated
include

in the remainder of the promotional examination

Shopay

and

Salmon.

Their common injuries, closely
2
related to one of the purposes for F.O.P's existence, are more
than sufficient to give F.O.P. standing in its representative
capacity.

Utah has not adopted, as have some courts, the additional
requirement that the interests the association seeks to protect
be
relevant
to the
association's
purpose.
Society of
Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1175 at n. 10
(Utah 1987) .
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The relief sought in this action will remedy the injuries
suffered by individual F.O.P. members.
the

Utah

Restaurant

Association

The initial criterion of

test

was

met

because

each

individual member had standing to sue for relief from a distinct,
palpable injury to his or her present and future employment that
adversely affected and will affect the individual.
F.O.P. also meets the second Utah Restaurant Association
criterion, which focuses on whether the individual participation
of each injured party is made indispensable by the nature of the
claim and of the relief sought.

Neither the claim nor the relief

sought will require the participation as parties, as opposed to
fact

witnesses,

of

any

F.O.P.

members.

Professional Journalists, 743 P.2d at 1175

See,

Society

(Utah 1987).

of
This

action can be litigated solely by plaintiff F.O.P., and the fact
that individual F.O.P. members may elect to participate as named
parties is irrelevant to the second criterion.

The relief F.O.P.

seeks will benefit all of its members by remedying the injuries
described above.

Each member will benefit when the promotion

examination process is declared null and void, the merit civil
service

system

is

restored,

state

law

is

adhered

to, the

candidates1 seniority is considered, only officers of the next
lower rank are allowed to participate and candidates are allowed
equal access to the study materials.

Any advantage improperly

conferred upon those also were illegally promoted or placed on
-30-

the sergeant promotion roster will not nullify, for those so
situated, the benefit of having the Nordfelt's and Commission's
wrongs addressed*
Notably, the relief sought in this case does not include a
request for monetary damages and, if granted, will benefit F.O.P.
members as if they had each sued individually.
Restaurant Association, 709 P. 2d at 1163

See e.g. , Utah

(association held to

have standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief but not
monetary damages on behalf of its members).
The bulk of the conflicts of interest shadow thrown by
defendants and observed by the trial court is formed out of the
incorrect notion that the status of the three F.O.P. members who
gained unfair advantage from the improper and illegal design and
administration
deprives

F.O.P.

of
of

the
the

promotion
standing

examination

process

it otherwise

has.

somehow
Correct

analysis of the question sheds a different light.

The suit by

F.O.P. would have the same effect on the three

"advantaged"

officers named by defendants as would a suit brought by any other
F.O.P. member individually.

R.I. Chapter, Association of General

Contractors v. Kreps, 450 F.Supp. 338, 346-47 at n.10 (D.Ct. R.I.
1978) .

In R.I. Chapter, the plaintiff brought an action seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief challenging a minority business
requirement of the Public Works Employment Act and the defendant
raised the issue of plaintiff's standing, alleging a conflict
-31-

between the association and its minority members.

The court held

the

action

plaintiff

had

standing

association

on behalf

of

minorities,

reasoning

that

competing

over

a

to

initiate

its members
conflict

particular

project

the

even though
among
did

an

some were

contract
not

as

members

disallow

the

association's standing to assert rights of its injured member.
In this case, no additional consequences can be realized just
because F.O.P. brings the action.

R.I. Chapter makes it clear

that an association need not adequately represent the interests
of any association members who receive advantage or benefit by
the illegal or improper acts complained of and that absence of
injury to some members or discrepancies between the injuries
suffered

by

an

association's

members

are

not

fatal

to the

association's standing.
Furthermore, the three "advantaged" F.O.P. members, under
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24, would be free to intervene in
the action to represent their own interests.

Any discrepancy or

incongruity between interests of individual F.O.P. members does
not affect F.O.P.'s standing.
Alternatively,

F.O.P.

should

be

granted

standing

under

either the second or third steps of the Jenkins v. Swan analysis.

Defendants abandoned any reliace, by direct argument or
inference, on the idea that proposed co-plaintiffs Shopay and
Salmon are not real parties in interest under Rule 17(a)
[R. 320-322].
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As a practical matter, because of the cost of the litigation, no
single injured police officer has an interest in the outcome of
the case greater than the cumulative interest of F.O.P.

The

issues are therefore unlikely to be raised at all, much less
pursued to conclusion, if the dismissal of this action is upheld,
and

for that reason F.O.P.fs standing

Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d

1145, 1150

should be recognized.
(Utah 1983); Kennecott

Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 454-55 (Utah
1985).

Plaintiffs also submit that the issues raised in this

case, involving violations of seniority consideration and next
lower rank requirements established by the Department's merit
civil service system and state law, in conjunction with the other
improprieties alleged, are sufficiently unique and important to
the public that standing should be recognized under the third
step

of

the

Jenkins

v.

Swan

standing

analysis.

Plaintiffs

alleged and sufficiently demonstrated F.O.P.fs standing in this
case.

The trial court's

ruling

is incorrect

and

should be

dismissed.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE APPELLATE
STANDING TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER F.O.P.
HAD STANDING.

In the trial court, defendants asserted that plaintiffs'
action was an attempt to obtain an extraordinary writ governed by
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B (1988) and Utah Supreme Court
Rule

19

(1987) .

This

assertion
-33-

may

have

been

fostered

by

plaintiffs1 allegation that "Plaintiffs have no other adequate or
speedy remedy at law to provide the relief requested herein [R.
117 at para. 15] .

Relying upon the general rule that under the

doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, "... persons
aggrieved by decisions of administrative agencies may not, by
refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to such agencies,
by-pass them, and call upon the courts to determine . . . matters
properly determinable originally by such agencies,"

S&G, Inc. ,

v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted),
defendant urged the trial court [R. 166-167, 225] to apply the
appellate standing test:
...[W]e
conclude
that
to
demonstrate
appellate
standing, one using a petition for a writ as a vehicle
to obtain appellate-type review of a trial court's
ruling must show the following: (i) the petitioner had
standing to proceed before the district court, (ii) the
petitioner is challenging the district court's ruling
adverse to him or her, and (iii) the petitioner
appeared and presented his or her claims to that court.
If the petitioner fails to establish any one of the
standing requirements, this Court will not consider the
claims.
Society of Journalists, 743 P.2d at 1172.
The trial court erroneously found [R. 433 at para. 11] and
incorrectly concluded that F.O.P. "... failed, both on the face
of the complaint and on the facts of the case, to meet its burden
to establish that the F.O.P. presented its claims to the Civil
Service Commission, and therefore does not have standing in this
case [R. 435 at para. 9].
-34-

Plaintiffs1
nature

of

an

action, however, is not one brought
extraordinary

writ

seeking

Plaintiffs filed a direct action.

temporary

in the
relief.

Utah Code Ann., §78-3-4(1)

(1988), provides, "The district court has original jurisdiction
in all matters civil and criminal not excepted
Constitution

and

not

prohibited

by

law."

in the Utah

Utah

Code Ann.,

§52-4-9 (2) (1977), provides:

"A person denied any right under

this

suit

chapter

may

commence

in

a

court

of

competent

jurisdiction to compel compliance with or enjoin violations of
this chapter... ."

The trial court ruled incorrectly when it, in

effect, added an extra hurdle to the factual and legal course
F.O.P. ran to establish its standing.
Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs must satisfy the Society
of Journalists appellate standing test, they plainly have done
so.

In Point I.B., supra, and Point II.B., ante, plaintiffs

demonstrate that both F.O.P. and Crowley met their respective
standing requirements.
address

its

Commission

grievances

would

have

Defendants1 argument that F.O.P. did not
to
been

presentation of the claims.

the

Commission

the

proper

admits

venue

for

that

the

initial

The fact that no formal mechanism

existed to present such claims to the Commission is demonstrated
by the statements of Crowley, Shopay and Salmon indicating the
Commission's

rules

and

regulations

did

not provide

guidance

regarding the process by which Departmental officers could object
-35-

to or seek review of improprieties in the promotion examination
process [R. 117, 332, 335, 339].

Even though no procedures were

in place to assist the presentation of the officers' claims, the
Commission, had it been performing its duties properly, was the
body before which the officers had standing.

There is also no

question that the officers received an adverse determination from
the Commission.

The October 4, 1989 letter signed by Guy Kimball

and Don Meyers summarily dismissed their claims

[R. 113, 116].

There can also be no doubt that the officers appeared, to the
extent

they

were

allowed,

and

presented

Commission in the August 23, 1989 letter

their

claims

to

the

[R. 10-12, 116, 332,

335, 339], as established at pp. 21-32, supra.

The trial court's

ruling that F.O.P. lacked standing is manifestly

incorrect and

should be reversed.

II.

A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING
CROWLEY DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO
BRING THIS ACTION.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT CONCERNING CROWLEY
ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.

In addition
plaintiffs

in

to

Point

the Crowley-related
II.A.,

the

findings

findings discussed
concerning

by

plaintiff

Crowley that plaintiffs contend are not supported by substantial
evidence

and

are

unequivocally

-36-

contradicted

by

the

facts

presented by plaintiffs' case are, using the number assigned by
the trial court:
7. Plaintiff Jim Crowley did not receive the minimum
required passing score on the written examination and,
therefore, did not proceed further in the promotional
process [R. 432] .
8. Plaintiff Jim Crowley did not suffer a distinct,
particularized and palpabable injury related to the
conduct of Defendants [R. 432].
Finding number 7 is supported by the Cory Ervin affidavit
supplied by defendants that asserts "... Crowley did not receive
a score of 75 or above..." [R. 185 at para. 4.d.] and describes
Crowley's score as a "... below passing score..." [R. 185 at
para. 4.e.].

From this evidence the trial court apparently made

the conclusory finding that Crowley did not achieve the "minimum
required passing score."

But no "minimum" score was required.

The memoranda issued by Nordfelt and the West Valley Personnel
Office

stated

those candidates who received

the top fifteen

scores on the written exam would advance to the
center"

[R. 6-7, 8-9,

erroneous.

107-108, 114].

Finding

"assessment

7 is clearly

The promotion examination announcements are better

evidence of the procedure used than Cory Ervin1s characterization
of what any Commission records may indicate.

The actual record

Cory Ervin relies on is neither identified in nor supplied with
his affidavit.
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Finding number 8 states conclusions that find their support
in the trial court's erroneous finding number 7, the fact Crowley
did not obtain one of the top fifteen scores on the written exam
and the fact he was not allowed to advance to the "assessment
center" [R. 7, 8-9, 185, 338]. The trial court's misperception
that a minimum
finding number

passing

score

existed

8 is erroneous.

is the primary

reason

Crowley missed, by a single

point, achieving one of the top fifteen scores on the written
exam

[R.

185,

suffered by him.

338].

Crowley

alleged

two

primary

injuries

First, he was improperly required to compete

against additional candidates holding only the P.O. I rank [R.
113-118, 338]. It is without question that at least one of those
P.O. I officers, Guy Dodge, scored higher than Crowley on the
written exam [R. 118, 186], thus bumping him from the list of the
top fifteen candidates.

As a result, he was precluded

from

obtaining a position on the final sergeant promotion roster that
was established after the "assessment center" and "promotability"
portions were completed.
Crowley

alleged

that

Clearly, Crowley was injured.
seniority

was

not

considered

Second,
in

the

promotion process as required by law and that he was unfairly
deprived of his approximately nine years of seniority
113-118, 339].

Seniority may be considered

[R. 6-9,

in myriad ways.

There is no evidence in the record establishing precisely how
seniority

would

have

been

considered
-38-

in

this

promotion

examination had it been conducted according to law.

Crowley

states that if seniority had been considered, he would have been
allowed to advance to the later stages of the promotion process
4
[R. 338].
Crowley's loss of an opportunity to compete for a
promotion

and his being required

to compete with

ineligible

candidates are, despite the trial court's misunderstanding of the
case, a distinct, particularized

and palpable injury directly

related to defendants' conduct.

Crowley also alleged he was

injured by the Commission being illegally constituted on October
4, 1989 and by candidates not being allowed equal access to study
materials [R. 10-13, 117].
The trial court's findings numbers 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 10 are
clearly erroneous and cannot support the incorrect ruling that
Crowley lacked standing.
B.

CROWLEY HAS STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION.

It is clear that Crowley alleged and demonstrated for the
trial court, as shown in sections II.A. and III.A. hereof, that
he

suffered

adverse

effects

caused

by

Nordfelt's

and

As a single illustrative example, even with the
participation of the unqualified P.O. I candidates, it is
possible that, based upon their seniority, candidates may
have been given credit towards their ultimate score on the
written exam. Such a method is logical at least to the
extent that it would afford candidates credit for their
seniority before the final fifteen were determined. Under
such an arrangement Crowley would have needed a credit of
only one point for his nine years seniority to make the
final fifteen.
-39-

the

Commission's actions and that the relief requested will remedy
those adverse effects.

Thus, Crowley plainly has a solid factual

basis for his standing to bring this action.
675 P.2d

1145

(1983);

accord, Kennecott

Jenkins v. Swan,

Corp. v. Salt Lake

County, 702 P.2d 451 (Utah 1985); Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713
(Utah 1978).
Even if the trial court's erroneous finding that Crowley did
not achieve the "minimum passing score" were true, Crowley would
have

standing.

Crowley

claimed

that

the

entire

evaluation

process was invalid, should be declared null and void and was
conducted contrary to established law.
It might be argued that so long as respondents
failed the test, they would have no cause to
complain because some unauthorized applicant
passed it. Such, however, is not the case. If no
one passed the test, the respondents would have
another chance to take an examination, and if
successful in the second examination, they would
be considered for promotion. If the position was
already filled by an ineligible man, there is no
vacancy to which respondents can aspire, and there
is no reason for giving another examination,
(emphasis added)
Hayward v. Pennock, 444 P.2d

59, 60, 21 Utah 2d 242

(1968).

Regardless of an eligible candidate's performance in any part of
the evaluation process, as a valid participant, he or she has a
personal stake in having the process conducted under the civil
service

merit

Commission

and

system

utilized

according

by

to the
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the

Department

laws of Utah.

and

the

Crowley had

standing by virtue of his participation as a candidate in the
promotional process that was alleged to have been improperly and
illegally designed and administered and of the consequences he
suffered thereby.
1176.

See, e.g., Society of Journalists, 743 P.2d at

Very simply put, Crowley was injured when he was not

afforded a fair, equitable and legal opportunity for promotion.
The factual allegations supporting his claims are plainly set
forth in the pleadings and affidavits on record, and therefore
the court erred in dismissing his claim for lack of standing.
Plaintiff requests this Court to overturn that ruling and the
dismissal of Crowley as a plaintiff in this action that resulted
therefrom.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
THE MOTION FOR JOINDER.

Plaintiffs admittedly terse motion for joinder [R. 216-217]
was initially supported by first affidavits filed by Shopay and
Salmon

[R. 229-232].

Later, Shopay, Salmon and Crowley filed

their "second" affidavits to offer additional factual support for
the joinder motion [R. 330-335].
Rule 20, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1987), provides, in
pertinent part:
All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs
if they assert any right to relief jointly,
severally, or in the alternative in respect of or
arising out of the same transaction occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences and if any
question of law or fact common to all of them will
arise in the action. ...
-41-

The

trial

court

denied

the

motion

for

joinder

after

determining "... that Plaintiff F.O.P. and Plaintiff Crowley did
not have standing and the subsequent dismissal of their complaint
renders William Salmon and David Shopayfs Motion for Joinder moot
[R. 435 at para. 12, 436] .
demonstrated

Plaintiffs submit that because, as

in the preceeding

sections of this brief, both

F.O.P. and Crowley manifestly had standing to bring this action,
the motion for joinder was not moot.

Provided either F.O.P. or

Crowley had standing, the motion for joinder was not moot and
should have been granted based upon the Second Amended Complaint
and from affidavits submitted by Shopay, Salmon and Crowley.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs/appellants request
that the trial court's rulings with respect to F.O.P.'s and
Crowley's standing be reversed, that the dismissal based on lack
of standing and therefore subject matter jurisdiction be reversed
and that the case be remanded back to the District Court for
trial.

In addition, plaintiff/appellants request that the trial

court's denial of the motion for joinder based on mootness be
reversed and the motion for joinder be remanded back to the
District Court with direction to allow proposed co-plaintiffs
Shopay and Salmon to join in the action.
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Rule 20. Permissive joinder of parties.
(a) Permissive joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if
they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them
will arise in the action. Ail persons may be joined in one action as defendants
if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any
right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact
common to all of them will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant need
not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded.
Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their
respective rights to relief, and against one or more defendants according to
their respective liabilities.
(b) Separate trials. The court may make such orders as will prevent a
party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of a
party against whom he asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against
him, and may order separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or
nreiudice.

JIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 65B

(4) in all other cases where an injunction
would be proper in equity.
Rule 65B. Extraordinary writs.
(a) Special forms of writs abolished. Special
forms of pleadings and of write in habeas corpus,
mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition, and
other extraordinary writs, as heretofore known, are
hereby abolished. Where no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy exists, relief may be obtained by
appropriate action under these rules, on any one of
the grounds set forth in Subdivisions (b) and (t) of this
rule.
(b) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be
granted:
(1) where any person usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, civil
or military, or a franchise, or an office in a corporation created by the authority of this state; or
any public officer, civil or military, does or permits to be done any act which by the provisions of
law works a forfeiture of his office; or an association of persons act as a corporation within this
state without being legally incorporated; or any
corporation has offended against any piovision of
the law, as it may have been amended, by or
under which law such corporation was created,
altered or renewed; or any corporation has forfeited its privileges and franchises by nonuser or
has committed an act amounting to a surrender
or a forfeiture of its corporate rights, privileges
and franchises or has misused a franchise or
privilege conferred upon it by law, or exercised a
franchise or privilege not so conferred; or
(2) where an inferior tribunal, beard or officer
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion* or
(3) where the relief sought is to compel any
inferior tribunal, or any corporation, board or
person to perform an act which the law specially
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station; or to compel the admission of a party to
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which he is entitled and from which he is unlawfully excluded by such inferior tribunal or by
such corporation, board or person; or
(4) where £he relief sought is to arrest the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board or
person, whether exercising functions judicial or
ministerial, when such proceedings are without
or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal,
corporation, board or person.
(c) Action by attorney general under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule. The attorney general may,
and when directed so to do by the governor shall,
commence any action authorized by the provisions of
Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule. Such action shall be
brought in the name of the state of Utah.
(d) Action by private person under Subdivision CbXl) of this rule. A person claiming to be entitled to a public or private office unlawfully held and
exercised by another may bring an acticn therefor. A
private person may bring an action upon any other
ground set forth in Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule, only
if the attorney general fails to do so after notice. Any
such action commenced by a private person shall be
brought in his own name. Upon filing the complaint,
such person shall also file an undertaking with sufficient sureties, in the same form required of bonds on
appeal under the provision of Rule 73 and conditioned
that such person will pay any judgment for costs or
damages recovered, against him in such action.

Rule 65B

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

(e) Nature and extent of relief under Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. Upon the filing of a complaint seeking relief under Subdivision (b)(2) of this
rule, the court may require notice to be given to the
adverse pcrty before issuance of the writ, or may
grant an order to show cause why such writ should
not be issued, or may grant the writ without notice. If
the writ is granted, it shall be directed to the inferior
tribunal, board, or officer, or to any other person having the custody of the iccord or proceedings, commanding such tribunal, board or officer to certify
fully to the court issuing the writ, within a specified
time, a transcript of the record and proceedings, describing or referring to them with sufficient certainty; and if a stay of proceedings is intended, requiring the party in the meantime to desist from further proceedings in the matter to be reviewed. The
review by the court issuing the writ shall not be extended further than to determine whether the inferior tribunal board or officer has regularly pursued
the authority of such tribunal, board or officer.
(f) Habeas corpus. Appropriate relief by habeas
corpus proceedings shall oe granted whenever it appears to the proper court that any person is unjustly
imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his hberty. If
the person seeking relief is imprisoned in the penitentiary and asserts that in the proceedings which
resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution of the United
States or under the Constitution of the state of Utah,
or both, then the person seeking such relief shall proceed in accordance with Rule 65B(i). In all other
cases, proceedings under this subdivision shall )oe
conducted in accordance with the following provisions:
(1) The complaint seeking relief shall, among
other things, .state that the person designated is
illegally restrained of his liberty by the defendant and the place where he is so restrained, if
known (stating wherein and the cause or pretense thereof, according to the best information
of the plaintiff, annexing a copy of any legal process or gi\ing a satisfactory explanation for failing so to do); that the legality of the imprisonment or restraint has not already been adjudged
upon a prior proceeding; whether another complaint for the same relief has been filed and relief
thereunder denied by any court, and if so attaching a copy of such complaint and stating the reasons for the denial of relief or giving satisfactory
reasons for the failure to do so.
(2) The complaint shall be filed in the court
most convenient to the plaintiff.
(3) Upon the filing of the complaint the court
shall, unless it appears from such complaint or
the showing of the plaintiff that he is not entitled
to any relief, issue a writ directed to the defendant commanding him to bring the person alleged to be restrained before the court at a time
and place therein specified, at which time the
court shall proceed in a summary manner to hear
the matter and render judgment accordingly. If
the writ is not issued the court shall state its
reasons therefor in writing and file the same
with the complaint, and shall deliver a copy
thereof to the plaintiff.
(4) If the defendant cannot be found, or if he
does not have such person in custody, the writ
(and any other process issued) may be served
upon any one having such person in custody, in
the manner and with the same effect as if he had
been made defendant in the action.

5i6,

(5) If the defendant conceals himself, or re-d
fuses admittance to the person attempting tor
serve the writ, or if he attempts wrongfully tol
carry the person imprisoned or restrained cut of
the county or state after service of the writ, the*
person serving the writ shall immediately arrest!
the defendant, or other person so resisting, and
bring him, together with the person designated
in the writ, forthwith before the court before
which the writ is made returnable.
(6) At the time of the issuance of the writ, the
court, may, if it appears that the person desig-i
nated will be carried out of the jurisdiction of the1
court or will suffer some irreparable injury before
compliance with the writ can be enforced, cause a
warrant to issue, reciting the facts, and directing
the sheriff to take such person and forthwith
bring him before the court to be dealt with ac-.
cording to law.
(7) The defendant shall appear at the proper
time and place with the person designated or.
show good cause for not doing so and must answer the complaint within the time allowed. The
answer must state plainly and unequivocally
whether he then has, or at any time has hsd, the
person designated under his control and restraint, and if so, the cause thereof. If such per-,
son has been transferred, the defendant must
state that fact, and to whom, when the transfer
was made, and the reason or authority therefor.
The writ shall not be disobeyed for any defect of
form or misdescription of the person restrained or
defendant, if enough is stated to show the meaning and intent thereof.
(8) The person restrained may waive his right
to be present at the hearing, in which case the
writ shall be modified accordingly. Pending a determination of the matter the court may place
such person in the custody of such individual or
individuals as may be deemed proper.
(g) When counsel appointed for petitioner. Any
person filing a petition for habeas corpus may be appointed counsel whenever the district court, upon examination of the petition, determines that the petition is not frivolous and that such person is financially unable to obtain representation. If the petition
for habeas corpus is frivolous, the district court shall,
without further action, dismiss the petition.
(h) When writ returnable. Any alternative writ
issued by a court or a judge thereof, may be made
returnable, and a hearing thereon may be had, at any
time as such court may in its discretion determine.
(i) Postconviction hearings.
(1) Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary
or county jail under a commitment of any court,
whether such imprisonment be under an original
commitment or under a commitment for violation of probation or parole, whu asserts that in
any proceedings which resulted in his commitment there v/as a substantial denial of his rights
under the Constitution of the United States or of
the state of Utah, or both, may institute a proceeding under this rule.
Such proceedings shall be commenced by filing
a complaint, together with a copy thereof with
the clerk of the court in which such relief is
sought. The complainant shall also serve a copy
of the complaint so filed upon the attorney general of the state of Utah if imprisoned in trie state
prison, or the county attorney of the cnunty
where imprisoned if in a county jail. Such service
may be made by any of the methods provided for

service in Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, er by mailing such copy to the attorney
general or county attorney by United States
mail, postage prepaid, and by filing with the
clerk of said court a certificate of mailing certifying under oath that a copy was so mailed to the
attorney general or county attorney. Upo;i the
filing of such a complaint, the clerk shall
promptly bring the same to the attention of the
presiding judge of the court in which such complaint is filed.
(2) The complaint shall state that the person
seeking relief's illegally restrained of his liberty
by the dafendant; shall state the place where he
is so restrained; shall state the dates of and identify the proceedings in which the complainant
was convicted and by which he was subsequently
confined and of which he now complains; and
shall set forth in plain and concise terms the factual data constituting each and every manner in
which the complainant claims that any constitutional rights were violated. The complaint shall
have attached thereto affidavits, copies of
records, or other evidence supporting such allegations, or shall state why the same are not attached.
The complaint shall also state whether or not
the judgment of conviction that resulted in the
confinement complained of has been reviewed on
appeal, and if so, shall identify such appellate
proceedings and state the results thereof.
The complaint shall further state that the legality or constitutionality of his commitment or
confinement has not already been adjudged in a
prior habeas corpus or other similar proceeding;
and if the complainant shall have instituted prior
similar proceedings in any court, state or federal,
within the state of Utah, he shall so state in his
complaint, shall attach a copy of any pleading
filed in such court by him to his complaint, and
shall set forth the reasons for the denial of relief
in such other court. In such case, if it is apparent
to the court in which the proceeding under this
rule is instituted that the legality or constitutionality of his confinement has already been adjudged in such prior proceedings, the court shall
forthwith dismiss such complaint, giving written
notice thereof by mail to the complainant, and no
further proceedings shall be had on such complaint.
(3) Argument, citations and discussion of authorities shall not be set forth in the complaint,
but may be set out in a separate supporting memorandum or brief if the complainant so desires.
(4) All claims of the denial of any of complainant's constitutionaJ rights shall be raised in the
postconviction proceeding brought under this
rule and may not be raised in another subsequent proceeding except for good cause shown
therein.
(5) [Deleted.]
(6) Within ten days after service of a copy of
the complaint upon him, the attorney general, or
the county attorney, as the case may be, shall
answer the complaint or otherwise plead thereto.
Any further pleadings or amendments shall be in
conformity with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(7) When an answer is filed, the court shall
immediately set the case for a hearing within
twenty days thereafter unless the coui*t in its discretion determines that further time is needed.

Prior to the bearing, the state or county shsa
obtain such transcript of proceedings or court
records as may be relevant and material to the
case. The court, on its own motion, or upon the
request of eithor party, may order a prehearing
conference if good reason exists therefor; but
such conference shall not he set so as to unreasonably delay the hearing on the mtrit3 of the
complaint. The complainant shall be brought be
fore the court for any hearing or conference.
If the court in which the complaint is filed determines that in the interest of convenience and
economy, the hearing should be transferred to
the district court having jurisdiction over the
place of confinement of complainant, the court
may enter a written order transferring such case
and shall set forth in such order its reasons for so
doing.
(8) In each case, the court, upon determining
the case, shall enter specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law and judgment, in writing, and
the same shall be made a part of the record in the
case.
If the court finds in favor of the complainant, it
shall enter an appropriate order with respect to
the judgment or sentence in the former proceedings and such further orders with respect to
rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail or discharge
as the court may deem just and proper in the
case.
(9) If the complainant is unable to pay the
costs of the proceedings, he may proceed in forma
pauperis upon the filing of an affidavit to that
effect, in which event the court may direct the
costs to be paid by the county in which he was
originally charged.
(10) Any final judgment entered upon such
complaint may be appealed to and reviewed by
the Supreme Court of Ucah as an appeal in civil
cases.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1985; Marclj 1. 1988.)
Rule 66. Receivers.
(a) Grounds for appointment. A receiver may be
appointed by the court in which an action is pending
or rias passed to judgment:
(1) In an action by a vendor to vacate a fraudulent purchase of property, or by p. creditor to subject any property or fund to his claim, or between
partners or ethers jointly owning or interested in
any property or fund, on the application of the
plaintiff, or of any party whose right to or interest in the property or fund, or the proceeds
thereof,,is probable, and where it is shown that
the property or fund is in danger of being lost,
removed or materially injured.
(2) In an action by a mortgagee for the foreclosure of his mortgage and sale of the mortgaged
property, where it appears that the mortgaged
property is in danger of being lost, removed or
materially injured; or that the conditions of the
mortgage have not been performed and that the
property is probably insufficient to discharge the
mortgage debt.
(3) After judgment, to carry the judgment into
effect.
(4) After judgment, to dispose of the property
according to th* judgment, or to preserve it during the pendency of an appeal, or in proceedings
in aid of execution when an execution has been
returned unsatisfied, or when the judgment
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band, wife, son, daughter, sister, brother, uncle, aunt,
nephew, niece, first cousins, mother-in-law, father-inlaw, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law or
daughter-in-law, is retained in office by any of said
officials shall be regarded as a separate offense. 1953
52-3-3. Penalty.
Any person violating any of the provisions of this
chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor.
1953
52-3-4. Exception in r o w n s .
In towns, this chapter shall not apply to the employment of uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces or cousins.
1953

CHAPTER 4
OPEN A N D PUBLIC MEETINGS
Section
52-4-1.
52-4-2.
52-4-3.
52-4-4.

52-4-5.

52-4-6.
52-4-7.
52-4-8.
52-4-9.

Declaration of public policy.
Definitions.
Meetings open to the public — Exceptions.
Closed meeting held upon vote of members
— Business — Reasons for meeting recorded.
Purposes of closed meetings — Chance
meetings and social meetings excluded
— Disruption of meetings.
Public notice of meetings.
Minutes of open meetings — Public records
— Recording of rneetings. (
Suit to void final action — Limitation —
Exceptions.
Enforcement of chapter — Suit to compel
compliance.

52-4-1. Declaration of public policy.
In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and
declares that the state, its agencies and political subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct of t h e people's
business. It is the intent of the law i h a t their actions
be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.
1977
52-4-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Meeting" means the convening of a public
body, with a quorum present, whether in person
or by means of electronic equipment, for the purpose of discussing or acting upon a m a t t e r over
which the public body has jurisdiction or advisory power. This chapter shall not apply to
chance meetings. "Convening," as used in this
subsection, means the calling of a meeting of a
public body by a person or persons authorized to
do so for the express purpose of discussing or acting upon a subject over which that public body
has jurisdiction.
(2) "Public body" means any administrative,
advisory, executive, or legislative body of the
state or its political subdivisions which consists
of two or moie persons that expends, disburses,
or is supported in whole or in part by tax revenue
and which is vested with che authority to make
decisions regarding the public's business. "Public
body" does not include any political party, group,
or caucus nor any conference committee, rules or
sifting committee of the Legislature.
(3) "Quorum" means a simple majority of the
membership of a public body, unless otherwise
defined by applicable law, but a quorum does not
include a meeting of two elected officials by
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themselves when no action, either formal or informal, is taken on a subject over which these
elected officials have jurisdiction.
i»€7

52-4-3. Meetings open to the public — Exceptions.
Every meeting is open to the public unless closed
p u r s u a n t to Sections 52-4-4 and 52-4-5.
1977
52-4-4.

Closed meeting held u p o n vote of members — B u s i n e s s — R e a s o n s for meeting recorded.
A closed meeting may be held upon the affirmative
vote of two-thirds of the members of the public body
present at an open meeting for which notice is given
p u r s u a n t to Section 52-4-6; provided, a quorum it
present. No closed meeting is allowed except as to
m a t t e r s exempted under Section 52-4-5; provided, no
ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, contract, or
appointment shall be approved at a closed meeting.
The reason or reasons for holding a closed meeting
and the vote, either for or against the proposition to
hold such a meeting, cast by each member by name
shall be entered on the minutes of the meeting.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require any meeting to be closed to the public.
1977

52-4-5. Purposes of closed meetings — Chance
meetings and social meetings excluded
— Disruption of meetings.
(1) A closed meeting may be held pursuant to Section 52-4-4 for any of the following purposes:
(a) discussion of the character, professional
competence, or physical or mental health of an
individual;

(b) strategy sessions with respect to collective
bargaining, litigation, or purchase of real properly;
(c) discussion regarding deployment of security personnel or devices; and
(d 1 investigative proceedings regarding allegations of criminal misconduct.

(2) This chapter shall not apply to any chance
meeting or a social meeting. No chance meeting or
social meeting shall be used to circumvent this chapter.
(3) This chapter shall not prohibit the removal of
any person who willfully disrupts a meeting to the
extent t h a t orderly conduct is seriously compromised.
1977

52-4-6. Public notice of meetings.
(1) Any public body which holds regular meetings
t h a t are scheduled in aavance over the course of a
year shall giv3 public notice at least once each year of
its a n n u a l meeting schedule as provided in this section. The public notice shall specify the date, time,
and place of such meetings.
(2) Jn addition to the notice requirements of Subsection (1) of this section, each public body shall give
not less than 2^ hours' public notice of the agenda,
date, time and place of each of its meetings.

(3) Public notice shall be satisfied by:
(a) posting written notice at the principal office of the public body, or if no such office exists,
at the building where the meeting is to be held;
and
(b^ providing notice to at least one newspaper
of general circulation within the geographic jurisdiction of the public body, or to a local media
correspondent.
(4) When because of unforeseen circumstances it is
necessary for a public body to hold an emergency
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JERRALD D. CONDER (#0709)
K. C. BENNETT (#3700)
Of CONDER & WANGSCARD
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, UT 84120
Telephone: (801) 967-5500
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER
OF POLICE LODGE #4 non-profit
Utah Corporation and JIM
CROWLEY,

]
I

CORRECTED
AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
i Case No. 89-0907667
DENNIS NORDFELT, WEST VALLEY
CHIEF OF POLICE AND WEST
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION/
Defendants.

1.

Plaintiff, West Valley Fraternal Order of Police Lod?e

#4 is a Utah non-profit corporation comprised of police officers
and support staff employed by West Valley City.
2.

Plaintiff, Jim Crowley is a West Valley Police Officer

and member of Lodge #4 West Valley Fraternal Order of Police.
3.

Defendant, Dennis Nordfelt

is the West Valley City

Chief of Police.
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4.

Defendant, West Valley Civil Service Commission is the

commission

appointed

pursuant

to

the

provisions

of

Section

10-3-1003 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 and charged with the responsibility of administering the Civil Service Laws as they apply to
West Valley City and its employees.
5.

On or about

June

6,

19 89 an

announcement

for the

position of sergeant was posted by the West Valley Police Department.

A copy of said announcement is attached hereto marked

Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein as though fully set forth.
6.

On or about July 7, 1989 a memorandum was issued by the

West Valley personnel office setting

forth the dates of the

written test, assessment center and weights to be considered for
promotability.

A copy of said memorandum

is attached hereto

marked Exhibit 2 and incorporated herein as though full}7 set
forth.
7.

On or about September 2, 1989 appointments were made to

the position or sergeant pursuant to the procedures and weighting
set forth in Exhibit 2.
8.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 10-3-1010 Utah

Code Annotated, 1953 the Civil Service Commission is directs^d
among other things to provide for promotion on the basis of
seniority in service.
9.
sion

The rules and regulations of the Civil Service Commis-

together

with

AMENDED COMPLAINT

the

procedures

adopted

to

provide

for
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promotion to sergeant failed as required by law, to consider
seniority in service as a basis for promotion.
10.

Section 10-3-1002 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 states:

". . . . N o appointments to any of the places of
employment constituting the classified civil service in
the departments shall be made except according to law
and under the rules and regulations of the Civil
Service Commission.
11.
Valley

On or about August 23, 1989 certain members of the West

Police

Department

requested

the

commission

to

review

alleged improprieties regarding the promotional examination for
the position of sergeant.

All of the signators to said request

are members of plaintiff, Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #4. A
copy of said request is attached hereto marked Exhibit 3 and
incorporated herein as though fully set forth.
12.

On or about October 4, 1939 without conducting a formal

hearing or convening a meeting to consider the complaints set
forth in Exhibit 3, two members of the Civil Service Commission
prepared

a letter summarily dismissing the complaints of the

individual officers.

A copy of said letter was delivered to a

representative of the West Valley Fraternal Order of Police on
November

2, 1989.

A copy of said letter is attached hereto

marked Exhibit 4 and incorporated herein as though

fully S'.-.'c

forth.
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13.

On or about October

4, 1989 the West Valley Civil

Service Commission was not legally constituted as required by the
provision of 10-3-1003 Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
14.

The conduct of the examination for sergeant examination

violated the provision of Section 10-3-1007 Utah Code Annotated,
1953 and Rule 11-12 of the West Valley Civil Service Policy and
Procedures.
15.

Plaintiffs have no other adequate or speedy remedy at

law to provide the relief requested herein.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
16.

The Provision

of

Section

3-1

of the Civil Service

Policy and Procedures Manual requires a promotion to be filled
from the next lower rank.
17.

On or about June 6, 1989, defendant Dennis Hordf^t

through his agents approached the chairman of the civil service
commission, Guy Kimball and requested that particular requirements be waived.
18.

Said request was in a letter generated in the office of

Chief Dennis Nordfelt hand delivered to Guy Kimball.
19.

On or about the same day, June 6, 19 89 defendant Guy

Kimball, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission signed the
aforementioned letter and marked it "approved".
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20.

This action was taken in violation of the Utah Open ond

Public Meetings Act and in violation of Rules of the West ValJjy
Civil Service Policy and Procedures Manual Section 1-6.
21.

This request by Chief of Police and its approval by ;he

Civil Service Commission was done with the intent to allow Guy
Dodge, as a person otherwise unqualified, to sit for the exam.
22.

By and through the actions of Chief Nordfelt and the

Civil Service Commission, Guy Dodge was allowed to sit for the
exam and did in fact receive the Sergeants Promotion.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand that the Court enter an order
nullifying the test results and promotion made pursuant thereto
and directing the West Valley Civil Service Commission to conduct
a new examination pursuant to their own rules and regulations and
as required by law with specific orders to consider seniority in
service as a basis for promotability.
DATED this /J>

day of

^ e . ^ / * ^

, 1991.

«**' C. B E M E T T
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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West Valley City

^ ^

POLICE DEPARTMENT

^L

)

\

June 6, 1989

MEMORANDUM
TO:

All Police Officers Eligible for Promotional
Examination - Sergeant

FROM:

Chief's Of f i<£lL iyjww***,
"TT

RE:

Promotional Examination

This memorandum i s to n o t i f y o f f i c e r s that t h e r e w i l l be a
promotional examination for an immediate Sergeant's position and
to establish a r o s t e r . Passing grade for a l l t e s t s will be set at
75%.
A l l q u a l i f i e d and i n t e r e s t e d c a n d i d a t e s need t o apply by
submitting a to/from to Assistant Chief Shreeve indicating their
i n t e r e s t and o u t l i n i n g q u a l i f i c a t i o n s no l a t e r than SxftihaBW:
im&tmte^xZm&iMtKxiamiX

NOON,

ON MONDAY, JUNE 1 9 ,

1989.

QUALIFICATIONS:
Must have four years of police service (plus two additional
years police experience if substituting for college).
Must have two years of college (two years police experience
can be substituted).
Must be off probation.
Must have above average performance evaluation.
WRITTEN ,EXAMIHATION:
AIT qualified candidates W I I L oe givenntwo, ftext books to
study from' 30 days prior to the written examination. This
examination will "consist of management concepts taken from
this reference material, and will be the ONLY material
needed to study for this examination. There will be no
questions from the criminal code or the policy manual on the
exam.

V

2470 South R e d w o o d Road

West Valley City Utah 84119

Phone (801) 974-5468

TTtmUW

Promotional Examination/Sergeant
June 6, 1989
Page 2

Candidates may pick up their text books from Lt. Moody or
Assistant Chief Shreeve on June 19th and 20th only.
The written examination will be given on Thursday, July 20,
1989.

ASSESSMENT CENTER:
Only the top 15 candidates (with a passing score) on the
written examination will be invited to attend a two-day
assessment center. The assessment center will be July 25th
and 26th, 1989.

Timas and places for both the written examination and assessment
center will be announced later.

iHinn?
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West Valley City

PERSONNEL OFFICE

July 7, 1989

MEMORANDUM
T0:

All Candidates for Promotional Examination - Sergeant

FROM:

Personnel Office

RE:

Promotional Examination

C ^

This memorandum is to notity officers who have applied to take
this promotional examination for an immediate Sergeant's position
of the times and location of the examination.

WRITTEN TEST:

July 2 0 , 1989 - G r a n g e r High S c h o o l
Cafeteria, 3690 South 3600 West - 9:00 a.m.
Two and one half hours will be allowed for
the written test.

ASSESSMENT CENTER:

The top 15 candidates from the written test
will be eligible to p a r t i c i p a t e in the
Assessment Center .
The Assessment Center will be held July 25
and 26, 1989 - P.O.S.T., 4501 Soutn 2700 West
- 8:00 a.m.

»H

woct v/aiipv Citv Utah 84119

Phone ' 8 0 1 ) 9 7 4 - 5 5 0 1
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Promotional Examination/Sergeant
June 6, 1989
Paqe 2

Candidates may pick up their text books from Lt. Moody or
Assistant Chief Shreeve on June 19th and 20th only.
The written examination will be given on Thursday, July 20,
1989.

ASSESSMENT CENTER:
Only the too 15 candidates (with a passing score) on the
written examination will be invited to attend a two-Oay
assessment center.
The assessment center will be July 25th
and 26th, 1989,

Times and places for both the written examination and assessioent
center will be announced later.

WEIGHTS FOR PROFITABILITY TESTING ARE AS FOLLOWS:
Assessment
Promotability
Written

40%
4 0%
20%

ouoog
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August 23, 1989

Wes;: Valley City
Civil Service Commission
Dear Commissioners:
We the undersigned police officers of West Valley City wish
to submit this letter outlining our concerns over certain
improprieties regarding the recent promotional examination for
the position of sergeant*
On August 15/ 1989 at a meeting of the membership of West
Valley Lodge #4 of the Fraternal Order of Police, Chief Nordfelt
responded to a list of allegations regarding the test.
In his
response Chief Nordfelt verified several of our concerns as fact,
and as being improper.
However, it appears that the police
administration does not intend to take any action in this matter.
A copy of our entire list of concerns as presented to Chief
Nordfelt is attached for consideration.
However, we would like
to address some of the issues we feel are of particular concern;
one of which did not come to light until after the initial list
was compiled.
First, as confirmed by Chief Nordfelt, one of the officers
who participated in the test was assigned to pick up the shipment
of books from which the test was derived. This officer surmised
what the books were for, and noted that he already owned a copy
of one of them. After obtaining the title of the second book he
purchased a copy of it also. The titles of these two books were
denied to all the other participants in the test until exactly
thirty days before the test was given.
We would like to note here that several officers scheduled
to take the test were going to be out of town on the date the
books were to be given out and were refused access to the books
even one day earlv.
Some of these officers were forced to wait
dayc, even weeks before gaining access to the study materials;
thus cutting short their time to prepare for the test.
This
5 Liuation gave one officer an unfair advantage over all other
oa r4- icipanLs .
These circumstances were brought to the attention

Civil Service Commission
August 23, 1989
Page 2

of the administration, however, they chose to ignore it and
allowed the officer to take the test. That officer's ultimate
position on the promotional list is number two.
Second, Salt Lake police supervisors were permitted to give
input as to the promotabi^ty of one officer currently assigned
to the Metro Narcotics Unit. However/ other officers who have
been assigned to the unit were not afforded the same opportunity.
In another promotability related issue the spouse of one of
the test participants were permitted to evaluate the
promotability of her spouse's competition.
Finally an issue that had not come to our attention until
after the initial list of concerns was compiled. The concern is
that seniority was not considered in the testing process. This
is in violation of state statute (10-3-1010 UCA).
In conclusion the undersigned police officers of West Valley
City request that the commission look into these allegations. We
further believe that given the circumstances described herein,
the exam in question should be considered invalid.
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WEST VALLEY O R © CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
2470 South Redwood Road
West Valley City, Utah
GOY W. KIHBALLr Chairman
October 4, 1989

-•The Civil Service Commission has reviewed the petition received from
severe-:! police officers, and the response to the petition submitted from the
Police Administration. While we recognize there were some areas of concern for
the candidates participating in the sergeant test and assessment center, it
appears that the administration of the testing process was proper and valid.
In response to the first concern regarding issuance of study material,
since all applicants were able to purchase both books if they desired, it does
not appear that one officer had a significant advantage over others. The
Commiosion feels, however, that Police Administration should not use possible
candidates to handle test materials prior to a test.
The second concern pertaining to promotability rating was evaluated by the
Personnel Department. The issue of using supervisors from Salt Lake Metro to
evaluate Charles Illsley appears to be relevant based on the amount of time he
spends under their supervision opposed to West Valley City supervisors. The
issue of Valleen Illsley being allowed to rate other candidates was evaluated
by the Personnel Department. It appears there were no improprieties on ratings
by Valleen Illsley.
The concern that seniority was not considered is incorrect. In order to
apply for the sergeant exam candidates were required to have at least four years
of police service. This meets the state statute (10-3-1010 OCA).
While the Commission regrets the contention this particular exam has
created and would admonish Administration to use better judgement in the future,
it appears that most of the concerns were addressed and answered sufficiently
by Administration. There is concern over the fact that officers who had no
involvement in the testing process signed the petition. The Commission feels
that the protest of a test should be supported by those involved in the testing
process, and not by individuals who have no direct knowledge of the facts.
This response should be posted and made available to the entire Police
Department staff.
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June 6, 1989

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Civil Service Commission

FROM:

Dennis J. Nordfelt, Police Chief

RE:

Waiver for Sergeant's Test

The Police Department is considering offering a Sergeant's test to
establish a promotional roster for that rank. As a result of
this, we request that the restriction in the Civil Service
requirements stating that officers applying for the position of
Sergeant be of a POII rank, be waived.
The reason for this request is that a number of officers currently
within the department who have time in grade to be a POII rank
were not offered the opportunity to take this promotion due to
financial restrictions. The Department believes that there are a
number of people in this position that are qualified and capable
to gain the rank of Sergeant. Therefore, since the reasons for
these officers not reaching the rank of POII qualifying them for
the Sergeant test is due to the Department's inability to offer
such a posit Lcn to them, we respectfully request that the Civil
Service Board waive this restriction for the testing.
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Jerrald D. Conder (#0709)
K. C. Bennett (#3700)
Of CONDER & WANGSGARD
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, UT 84120
Telephone: (801) 967-5500
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and William Salmon and David Shopay
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY CITY FRATERNAL
ORDER OF POLICE LODGE #4, a
non-profit Utah corporation,
and JIM CROWLEY,

1

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF
DAVID N. SHOPAY

Plaintiffs,
-vs-

'
i Civil No. 89-0907667 CV

DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley
Chief of Police, and WEST
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,

]
i Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE :
STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff, David N. Shopay under oath deposes and says:
1.

My name is David N. Shopay.

2.

I have filed a Motion for Joinder requesting permission

to join the action as a party plaintiff.

"0330

3.

All statements contained herein are based on my own

personal knowledge.
4.

I have been employed since November 10, 1980, as a West

Valley City Police Officer and hold the rank of POII.
5.

As a West Valley Police Officer, I am subject to the

protections and rules and regulations of the West Valley Civil
Service Merit Commission.
6.

On the date the written Sergeants examination was given,

I had 8 years of seniority, held the rank of POII and met all of
the

other

announced

eligibility

requirements

for promotion to

sergeant.
7.

I passed all aspects of the evaluation process and was

placed on the promotion roster.

I had more department seniority

than anyone above me on the promotion roster.
8.

I received no points or other consideration based on my

seniority as compared to the seniority of other qualified candidates .
9.

Of the individuals on the promotion roster ahead of me,

three of those individuals held only the rank of POI prior to time
of the evaluation process.
10.

Had the Civil Service Merit Commission not violated the

Open and Public Meetings Act, I would have been number 4 on the

Page -2-
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promotion roster, even though seniority was not considered in the
evaluation process.
11.

I was not offered the protection I believe the merit

system and the Civil Service Merit Commission

is designed to

provide me in the promotion process, even though I signed a letter
to the commission objecting to the improper manner in which the
evaluation process was conducted.
12.

The

rules and

regulations

of the West Valley

Civil

Service Merit Commission do not and did not provide me with any
procedural rights to seek a meaningful hearing before the Commission, nor was such a hearing ever provided.
DATED this

id

day of September, 1991.

, /

Dav:i d N". Shopay '

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s

/$%

<?

day of

^^7

7

September,

1991.
/;
UyUZ^^L^
NOTARY PUBLIC j
SANDRA LARSEN ]

OTARY PUBLIC

10 Exchange Place 11th Floor j
Sail LaKe City Utah 34111
My Commission Expires
January 14.1994

STATE OF UTAH
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Jerrald D. Conder (#0709)
K. C. Bennett (#3700)
of CONDER & WANGSGARD
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, UT 84120
Telephone: (801) 967-5500

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and William Salmon and David Shopay
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY CITY FRATERNAL
ORDER OF POLICE LODGE #4, a
non-profit Utah corporation,
and JIM CROWLEY,

y

i SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF
'' WILLIAM SALMON

Plaintiffs,
-vs-

'
Civil No. 89-0907667 CV

DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley
Chief of Police, and WEST
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,
Defendants.

i Judge Leslie A. Lewis
1
]

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE :
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff, William Salmon under oath deposes and says:
1.

My name is William Salmon.

2.

I have filed a Motion for Joinder requesting permiss.-on

to join the action as a party plaintiff.

"0333

3.

All statements contained

herein are based on my own

personal knowledge.
4.

I have been employed since December 6, 1982, as a West

Valley City Police Officer and hold the rank of POII.
5.

As a West Valley Police Officer, I am subject to the

protections and rules and regulations of the West Valley Civil
Service Merit Commission.
6.

On the date the written Sergeants examination was given,

I had 6i years of seniority, held the rank of POII and met all of
the other announced eligibility

requirements

for promotion to

sergeant.
7.

I passed all aspects of the evaluation process and vas

placed on the promotion roster.

I had more department seniority

than 7 individuals above me on the promotion roster.
8.

I received no points or other consideration based on my

seniority as compared to the seniority of other qualified candidates.
9.

Of the individuals on the promotion roster ahead of me,

three of those individuals held only the rank of POI prior to time
of the evaluation process.
10.

Had the Civil Service Merit Commission not violated the

Open and Public Meetings Act, I would have been number 9 on the

Page -2-
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promotion roster, even though seniority was not considered in the
evaluation process.
11.

I was not offered the protection I believe the merit

system and the Civil Service Merit Commission

is designed to

provide me in the promotion process, even though I signed a letter
to the commission objecting to the improper manner in which the
evaluation process was conducted.
12.

The rules and

regulations of the West Valley

Civil

Service Merit Commission do not and did not provide me with any
procedural rights to seek a meaningful hearing before the Commission, nor was such a hearing ever provided.
DATED this

fO

day of September, 1991.

William Salmon

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e

me t h i s

/&&

day of

September,

1991.

du^yJA^

?l4t^<L<^

NOTARY PUBLIC
SANDRA LARSEN
10 Exchange Place 11th Floor i
Salt Lake City. Utah 8 4 m
My Commission Expires
January 14,1894

STATE OF UTAH
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Jerrald D. Conder (#0709)
K. C. Bennett (#3700)
of CONDER & WANGSGARD
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone: (801) 967-5500
Fax (801) 967-5563
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-
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Attorney for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY CITY FRATERNAL
ORDER OF POLICE LODGE #4, a
non-profit Utah corporation,
and JIM CROWLEY,

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF
JIM CROWLEY

Plaintiffs,
-vsDENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley
Chief of Police, and WEST
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,

Civil No. 89-0907667 CV
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
;OUNTY OF SALT LAKE)

ss.

COMES NOW Jim Crowley who, after being sworn upon his oath,
deposes and says:
1.

My name is Jim Crowley.

2.

I am a plaintiff in the above-referenced action and a

citizen of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

"0336

3.

All statements made herein are based on my own personal

knowledge•
4.

I am employed as a police officer in West Valley C? :*.y

and have been so employed since July of 1980.
5.

1 attained the rank of POII in approximately 1981 ,-xid

since that time have held that rank.
6.

Presently I am a member of F.O.P. Lodge #4 and hold the

positions of national trustee and lodge president.
7.

F.O.P. Lodge #4 is comprised of two classes of member-

ship, (a) certified peace officers, and

(b) support staff em-

ployed by the West Valley City Police Department.
8.

Only certified peace officers with a rank of POII were

entitled to promotion to the rank of sergeant.
9.

Of the 99 certified officers presently employed by t>e

West Valley Police Department 89 are members of F.O.P.
10.

Approximately

40

individuals

participated

in

the

sergeant promotion process and all were members of F.O.P. Loc»<7e
TV *X .

11.

All members of F.O.P. Lodge #4, as well as all otii^r

certified police officers employed by the West Valley Police
Department, are subject to the protection and requirements .-is
well as the specific rules and regulations of the merit system
and the West Valley Civil Service Merit Commission.

-2-
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12.

A major purpose of F.O.P. Lodge #4 is to ensure fair

and equal treatment of all Lodge members in their employment,
including the promotion process, for the benefit of all Lodge
members.
13.

I personally participated in the sergeants examination.

14.

I failed to pass the written examination by 1 point and

was not allowed to proceed to the next level of consideration.
did

not

receive

any

points

or

consideration

because

I

of my

seniority.
15.

Had the Commission considered seniority as required by

state law, I believe I would have been allowed to continue in the
promotion process
16.

At the time of the examination I had 9 years seniority.

17.

I further believe the entire testing and promotion

process was invalid because of the illegal waiver of the POII
requirement by the Commission in violation of the Open and Public
Meetings Act and, further, that the Commission improperly failed
to consider seniority in the promotion process.
18.

Had I been aware of the department's request to waive

the POII requirement, I would have attended the meeting as a
representative of F.O.P., and individually, to object.

Because

no meeting was held, my right, as well as F.O.P.fs right, to
object or be heard was violated.

-3-
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19.

I signed a letter to the Commission objecting to Lne

procedure

followed

in

the

sergeant's

promotion

evaluation

process.
20.

There is no process or procedure set forth in the ru?.es

and regulations of the Commission authorizing me or anyone else
to appeal or seek a hearing before the Commission to object :o
the illegalities that occurred in the evaluation process.
DATED this /OHL day of September, 19J

(^6^*7%?-

CROWLEY

SUBSCRIBED AND
September, 1991.

SWORN

to

before

me

this

^g^Cg^i^_^

/&&

day

or.

t^y&SlsZ^z^

Notary Public
NOTARY PUBLIC
SANDRA LARSEN

10 Exchange Place 11th Floor
Salt Lake City. Utth 841 \ \
My CommlMiOfl Exptits
January 1< 1694

STATE OF UTAH

-4-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER
OF POLICE LODGE #4, a
nonprofit Utah corporation,
and JIM CROWLEY,

COURT'S RULING
CIVIL NO.

890907667

Plaintiffs,
vs.
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley
City Chief of Police, and
WEST VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,
Defendants.

A Notice to Submit( having been
4-501,

Code

of Judicial

filed, pursuant to Rule

Administration,

in

connection

with

defendants' Motion to Dismiss, defendants' Motion to Strike
Plaintiffs'
defendants'
Joinder.

Supplemental
Motion

to

Memorandum

Dismiss,

and

in

Opposition

to

plaintiffs' Motion

for

The Court having reviewed the Motion, Affidavits in

support and Reply Memorandum and the Memorandum in opposition,
and the relevant law and being fully advised, finds good cause
to rule as stated herein.

0042ft

Defendants'

Motion

to

RULING

PAGE TWO

WEST VALLEY F.O.P. V. NORDFELT

Strike

plaintiffs'

Supplemental

Memorandum in Opposition to defendants' Motion to Dismiss is
denied.

Defendants'

Complaint

in

this

Motion

matter

to
is

Dismiss

dismissed

Plaintiffs' Motion for Joinder is Denied.

is

granted.

without

The

prejudice.

Because the matter

is dismissed for plaintiffs' lack of standing, and this is not
an adjudication

on the merits of this claim; the claim

dismissed without prejudice.

On March

is

23, 1992, the Court

signed defendants' proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law,

Decision

and

Order

(second

draft).

Pursuant

to

plaintiffs' Objection, the Court changed the Order on page 7 to
read:

"The

Complaint

in

this matter

is dismissed

without

prejudice."
Dated this_f_2_d£y of March, 1992.

5LIF^A. 'LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

"0429

WEST VALLEY F.O-P. V. NORDFELT
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RULING

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of
this

the

foregoing

Court's

Ruling,

to

the

following,

.day of March, 1992:

Jerrald D. Conder
K. C, Bennett
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120-4099
J. Richard Catten
Assistant City Attorney
Attorney for Defendants
3 600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, Utah 84119

/^i^
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WES'.-? VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER
OF POLICE LODGE #4,
a nonprofit Utah corporation,
ANr JIM CROWLEY,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley
City Chief of Police, AND WEST
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE
COV5KISSION,

Civil No. 89-0907667
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.
The

Court,

upon

review

of

the

pleadings,

memoranda,

affidavits, authorities and arguments of the parties, and being
fulxy

advised

in

the premises, hereby

makes

and

enters

the

following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order
witn respect to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Defendants' Motion
to Strike Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and the Motion for Joinder.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about July 20, 1989, West Valley City conducted a

promotional examination for the position of Sergeant in the West
Valley City Police Department.
2.

One year of service with -the West Valley City Police

Department was required in order to be eligible for promotion to
Sergeant.
3•

The requirements for promotion to Sergeant required that

applicants hold the rank of Police Officer within the West Valley
City Police Department,
4.
and

Within the rank of Police Officer, all grades (POI, POII

POIII) were

eligible

for

promotion

to

Sergeant

with

no

preference being given to the members of any one grade.
5.
and

On or about March 28, 1991, FOP members William Salmon

David

Shopay

filed

a Motion

for

Joinder

as

additional

Plaintiffs in this action.
6.

Plaintiff

Jim

Crowley

participated

in

the

written

examination portion of the Sergeant promotional process.
7.

Plaintiff

Jim

Crowley

did

not

receive

the

minimum

required passing score on the written examination and, therefore,
did. not proceed further in the promotional process.
8.

Plaintiff

particularized

and

Jim

Crowley

did

not

palpable injury related

suffer

a

distinct,

to the conduct of

Defendants.
9.

The Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #4

(FOP) is an

association consisting of a majority of the officers of the West
2

Valley

City

Police

Department,

including

both

officers

who

•participated in the Sergeant promotional process and officers who
die not,
10.

Members

of

the

FOP

did

not

suffer

distinct,

par .'icularized and palpable injury related to the conduct of
Descendants.
11.

Plaintiff FOP did not present its claims to the Civil

Service Commission prior to commencement of this lawsuit.
12.

Members of the FOP were involved in formulating and

conducting the Sergeant promotional process.
13.

Members of the FOP would lose their promotion to Sergeant

should Plaintiff FOP's action be successful.
14.

Members of the FOP were deposed as adverse witnesses by

Pleintiffs.
15.

Defendant Dennis Nordfelt was a member of the FOP at the

tijv.e the action was filed and until October, 1991.
16.

On or about August 23, 1991, this matter was orally

argued before the Court.

Subsequent to that argument, Plaintiffs

submitted a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.

Defendants thereupon filed a Motion to Strike

Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby
enters the following Conclusions of Law:
1.

Plaintiffs appearing before the Court must have standing

in order to bring a lawsuit.
3
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2.

The

burden

of

establishing

standing

is

upon

the

plaintiffs.
3.

To establish standing, individual plaintiffs must show

that they have personally suffered some distinct, particularized
and palpable injury that is related to the defendant's conduct.
4.

To establish standing, plaintiff associations must show

that individual members of the association have suffered distinct,
particularized and palpable injuries related to the defendant's
conduct, thereby showing that individual members of the association
have standing.
5.

To establish standing, plaintiff associations must show

that the action does not require individual participation of the
members of the association.

This standard is not met if conflicts

of interest exist within and between the association and its
members.
6.

To establish standing, plaintiffs who challenge or seek

review of the actions or orders of a lower commission must show
that:
a)

the plaintiff had standing before the appropriate
lower body;

b)

the plaintiff presented

the claim to the lower

body;
c)

a ruling by the lower body was adverse to the
plaintiff.

7.

Plaintiff Crowley has failed, both on the face of the

comolaint and on the facts of the case, to meet his burden to
4

establish that he suffered a distinct, particularized and palpable
injury related to the conduct of Defendants, and therefore does not
have standing in this case.
8.

Plaintiff

FOP has

failed, both on the face of the

complaint and on the facts of the case, to meet its burden to
establish that individual members of the FOP suffered distinct,
particularized and palpable injuries related to the^ conduct of
Detendants, and therefore does not have standing in this case.
9.

Plaintiff

FOP has

failed, both on the face of the

complaint and on the facts of the case, to meet its burden to
establish that the FOP presented its claims to the Civil Service
Commission, and therefore does not have standing in this case.
10.

Plaintiff

FOP has

conflicts within and

between

the

association and its members that preclude the association from
representing its members and requires the individual participation
of the members of the association, and therefore does not have
standing in this case.
11.

Standing is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.

12.

The

Court's

determination

that

Plaintiff

FOP

and

Pldintiff Crowley do not have standing and the subsequent dismissal
of rheir complaint renders William Salmon and David Shopay's Motion
for Joinder moot.
13.

It is within the discretion of the Court to accept

supplemental memoranda and affidavits provided by the parties.

5
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DECISION
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, it is the decision of the Court that Plaintiff FOP and
Plaintiff Jim Crowley have not established standing necessary to
bring

this

lawsuit.

Based upon the facts

set

forth in the

complaint, and upon a close examination of the facts of the case,
the Court finds that Plaintiff Jim Crowley has not personally
suffered a distinct, particularized and palpable injury related to
Defendants' conduct which would provide him with standing in this
case.

The

established
distinct,

Court
that

further

finds

that

Plaintiff

FOP

has

not

individual members of the FOP have suffered

particularized

and

palpable

injuries

related

to

Detendants' conduct. The Court further finds that clear conflicts
of interest exist within and between the FOP association and its
members, which prevent it from meeting the established criteria for
standing of an association.

In addition, the Court finds that the

FOP has failed to present its claims to the appropriate lower body,
the Civil Service Commission.
It

is

the

decision

of

the

Court

to

accept

Plaintiffs'

Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss.
It is the Decision of the Court to deny the Motion for Joinder
since the Court has determined that Plaintiffs lack standing and
th*> Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction over the action.

-5-

ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Decision:
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED tha~
Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss is granted, and that the complaint in this matter
is dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Moticon
for Joinder is denied.
MADE and ENTERED this

/(J

^

day of

/

'W'^L^

, 1991,

u?tfdg^ Leslie A. Lewis
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